Re: gnupg rsa question // why use e of 41 ?

daniel bleichenbacher wrote:
> Sorry, I do not agree with this opinion. There are many attacks that
> work
> well with very small exponents such as e=3, but don't work or are much
> harder with e=65537 or larger. Of course these attacks can be avoided
> if implemented correctly. But implementations do have mistakes. And
> from
> analysing many cryptographic libraries I know that these libraries have
> much
> more mistakes that one commonly expects. Thus, to me it seems to be a
> good
> idea to make RSA implementations more robust by avoiding the smallest
> exponents. In fact, I'd even avoid e=41 and just generally use at least
> e=65537.

Without padding even e=65537 is not secure.

What's your point?

Tom
Received on Mon May 1 02:06:19 2006