Re: One time pads
Available news archives: comp.lang.tcl - comp.lang.python - comp.security.firewalls - sci.crypt - comp.lang.php - comp.lang.javascript
Google
 
Web news.hping.org


sci.crypt archive

Re: One time pads

From: John E. Hadstate <jh113355@hotmail.com>
Date: Sat Jun 18 2005 - 17:21:14 CEST

"StableXYZN5" <stringtheory2063@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1119098129.073550.142780@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> So maybe armed gaurds, safe deposit boxes, encrypting the
> one-time
> pad, confusing the location of the pad, etc might work.
> Any of those I
> guess would be good depending on the situation. Thanks for
> answering my
> question!
>
> However, by encrypting the one time pad, Alice's origonal
> file is only
> as secure as the key/password used to encrypt the pad

plus the amount of security afforded by physical,
procedural, etc. constraints on access to the encrypted key
material.

And it probably is a "plus" (as opposed to a "times")
assuming that it's fairly easy (compared to, say, breaking
another cipher) to recognize when you've overcome the first
access hurdle and obtained access to the encrypted OTP and
you only have to do this once.

Basically, however, you're right. There's no point to
encrypting an OTP; you might as well use the encryption
directly to protect your confidential material. Once the
protection (be it physical or cryptological) on a OTP is
busted, the OTP is busted.

>
Received on Thu Sep 29 21:44:40 2005