dual sets of OTP's // intentional leakage of the misleading one // feasible ?

assume that Bob and Alice have a correspondence using a codebook, _CB_
, of many OTP's,
one for each message,

can they now set up a 'decoy' codebook _dCB_ , composed of OTP's that
will decrypt the ciphertext of the 'real' message, into a deliberate
mis-informational message,
and then 'leak' the codebook?

(assume further, that they agree on pre-arranged unique ciphertexts for
each message,
but change the OTP's accordingly in both CB and dCB)

in order for this to work,
do the real and decoy plaintexts have to be exactly the same length?

(not terrible if they do, since the 'real' one can just have extra
padding as necessary, with a note that of where the padding starts and
that it is done as filler to equal the length of the decoy message)

is this scheme feasible?

tia,
vedaal
Received on Thu Sep 29 21:44:45 2005