Re: dual sets of OTP's // intentional leakage of the misleading one // feasible ?
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Re: dual sets of OTP's // intentional leakage of the misleading one // feasible ?

From: Enno Ruijters <ennoruytNO@SPAMhome.nl>
Date: Sun Jun 19 2005 - 11:42:49 CEST

"vedaal" <vedaal@hush.com> schreef in bericht
news:1119157362.345368.102030@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> assume that Bob and Alice have a correspondence using a codebook, _CB_
> , of many OTP's,
> one for each message,
>
> can they now set up a 'decoy' codebook _dCB_ , composed of OTP's that
> will decrypt the ciphertext of the 'real' message, into a deliberate
> mis-informational message,
> and then 'leak' the codebook?
>
> (assume further, that they agree on pre-arranged unique ciphertexts for
> each message,
> but change the OTP's accordingly in both CB and dCB)
>
>
> in order for this to work,
> do the real and decoy plaintexts have to be exactly the same length?
>
> (not terrible if they do, since the 'real' one can just have extra
> padding as necessary, with a note that of where the padding starts and
> that it is done as filler to equal the length of the decoy message)
>
> is this scheme feasible?
>
>
> tia,
> vedaal
>

I'm not an expert, but I think the decoy codebook could be detected as it is
not completely random, while the real one (hopefully) is.

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Received on Thu Sep 29 21:44:46 2005