Re: One time pads

StableXYZN5 wrote:
> Ok, understood. Lets pretend that the distributing of the key from
> Alice to Bob is secure. Lets just pretend its some hypothetical way
> they did it. Now Bob has the key, he got it, it was distributed. But he
> isnt going to use it for another week.

The One-Time-Pad assumes a uniform-random keystream, known to
Bob and Alice, but entirely unknown to the attacker. How to
distribute and store such a keystream is outside the definition
of the OTP.

> Do you see what I am saying? I have thought about this and thought
> about it, and there seems no way in hell to secure a key for any length
> of time AFTER it is even securely sent to its destination!

Securing the secret/private key is a problem regardless of the
particular cipher, and there are some reasonable measures. For
example, one might split the key into multiple parts, such that
one needs all of the parts (or perhaps some quorum) to
reconstruct the key.

-- 
--Bryan