Re: Potential DoS on Bittorrent
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Re: Potential DoS on Bittorrent

From: anthonyberet <nospam@me.invalid>
Date: Sun Aug 28 2005 - 11:13:51 CEST

Twisted One wrote:
> Stephen Sprunk wrote:
>
>> Same for the one I'm reading, at least in the .torrent file. Perhaps
>> once a
>> piece is started, the sender directly transmits hashes of the
>> subpieces to
>> the receiver? See below on why I think this may happen.
>
>
> This would suck. If we assume the sender of subpieces is untrusted, then
> the hash they send is untrusted. It will match the data, even if the
> data is bogus and the big piece will hash-fail, just so they can't be
> fingered as the bad node, and so the downloader has to get the whole
> piece again and not just the bad subpiece.
>
Tut! - the HASH is in the .torrent file, which are usually to be trusted.
Received on Thu Sep 29 21:51:20 2005