arachnidster@gmail.com wrote:
> Crypto@S.M.S wrote:
> > > Compounding the problem, to launch a pass-phrase search, all the
> > > attacker needs from the users is CryptoSMS ciphertext. According
> > > to descriptions appearing to be from a CryptoSMS insider, the
> > > symmetric key is derived from the pass-phrase, without the use
> > > of local-stored cryptovariables, nor key-amplification
> > > techniques, nor public-key methods.
> > >
> >
> > By key-amplification, do you mean salting and stretching?
> > If so, please note that CryptoSMS does both.
>
> And yet you've never disclosed how CryptoSMS does this. How is anyone
> supposed to attack your scheme to test its security if you don't fully
> reveal how it encrypts messages, let alone release the relevant
> source?
>
> > CryptoSMS uses pass phrases because it does not store key rings.
> > Hence no public key crypto. For reasons discussed before, and
> > re-mentioned recently in this thread.
> >
> > You are jumping to conclusions when you write "cryptographic
> > incompetence", particularly since you don't know me or my
> > experience.
>
> The result, as pointed out, is that the passphrase can be brute-forced
> from ciphertext.
"In less than 1 hour" ... according to your crypto-pimpdaddy Joe "the blow"
Asswood ...
Received on Thu Sep 29 21:53:07 2005