arachnidster@gmail.com wrote:
> "- Prof. Jonez©" wrote:
> > > > CryptoSMS uses pass phrases because it does not store key rings.
> > > > Hence no public key crypto. For reasons discussed before, and
> > > > re-mentioned recently in this thread.
> > > >
> > > > You are jumping to conclusions when you write "cryptographic
> > > > incompetence", particularly since you don't know me or my
> > > > experience.
> > >
> > > The result, as pointed out, is that the passphrase can be
> > > brute-forced from ciphertext.
> >
> > "In less than 1 hour" ... according to your crypto-pimpdaddy Joe
> > "the blow" Asswood ...
>
> I'm sorry, what's the relevance of that here? Regardless of how long
> it takes (and the 'less than 1 hour' claim was with regards to
> determining a preimage for an MD5 hash in limited circumstances, not
> brute-forcing
> the passphrase used to encrypt a set of messages),
"This will yield the entire original passphrase,
leading immediately to a complete compromise. So 1 hour."
> > From: "Joseph Ashwood" <ashwood@msn.com>
> > Subject: Re: crypto sms
> > Message-ID: <dJ5ue.882$N22.328@newssvr21.news.prodigy.com>
> > NNTP-Posting-Host: 67.118.12.39
> > NNTP-Posting-Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 00:23:37 EDT
> > Organization: SBC http://yahoo.sbc.com
>
> > "Certainly. Assuming a common passphrase length of around 20
> > characters, and assuming it is English, this will have 20-30 bits
> > of entropy, MD5 will be enough to uniquely identify each of these,
> > and MD5 can be effectively reversed under these circumstances in
> > under 1 hour. This will yield the entire original passphrase,
> > leading immediately to a complete compromise. So 1 hour."
> the issue remains.
> What exactly does your latest random insult add to the conversation?
> It certainly isn't refuting anything.
"This will yield the entire original passphrase,
leading immediately to a complete compromise. So 1 hour."
Received on Thu Sep 29 21:53:08 2005